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“Sometimes corruption is slowed by shedding light into what was 
previously shadowed.” 
—Paul Wolfowitz1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Arizona [is] ground zero for ‘dark money’ campaigns.”2  That line 
appeared in a 2016 article in the Arizona Republic after New York 
University released a study detailing the explosion of “dark money” in state 
and local politics.3  That study found that Arizona saw “by far the biggest 
surge in dark money”4 in the four years following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC.5  During the 2014 election cycle, 
Arizona had approximately $10.3 million in dark money coursing through 
its political veins—more than any other state examined by the study.6 
“Dark money” is the money spent on political campaigns from 
undisclosed donors.  To illustrate, suppose that Exxon wants to give $1 
 
* Attorney, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix, Arizona; J.D., Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law—Arizona State University; B.A., magna cum laude, Iowa State University.  
I would like to thank Professor Paul Bender for his guidance and support while writing this 
Article.  I would also like to thank Laurie Roberts and Mary Jo Pitzl at the Arizona Republic 
for continually following Arizona campaign finance reform and for shedding light on the 
corrupting influence dark money can have on local politics.  1 Françoise Grouigneau & 
Richard Hiault, An Interview With Paul Wolfowitz, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006.  Paul 
Wolfowitz is the former dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 
at Johns Hopkins University. 
 2  Laurie Roberts, Will Arizona Stand Up to Dark Money?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 29, 
2016, available at http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-
ed/laurieroberts/2016/06/29/roberts-arizona-read-you-stand-up-dark-money/86493966/.  
 3  CHISUN LEE ET AL., SECRET SPENDING IN THE STATES (2016) (published by NYU Law 
School’s Brennan Center for Justice).   
 4  Id. at 7.  
 5  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 6  Lee et al., supra note 3, at 7, 10.   
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million to Senator X from Arizona because Exxon thinks Senator X will be 
sympathetic to the needs of the fossil fuel industry in the Southwest.  
Exxon cannot give $1 million directly to Senator X in exchange for 
favorable votes—that exceeds direct campaign contribution limits and 
would likely amount to quid pro quo bribery, which, for now, is still illegal.  
In the post-Citizens United world, however, there are three easy ways 
Exxon can use that money to get Senator X reelected: (1) it can donate to 
an already-existing Political Action Committee, which will in turn spend 
that money to get Senator X reelected; (2) it can set up its own Political 
Action Committee, which will in turn spend that money to get Senator X 
reelected; or (3) it can donate to a politically-minded 501(c)(4) 
organization, which will in turn spend that money to get Senator X 
reelected. 
If Exxon chooses option one or two, it will be forced to disclose its 
donation to Arizona’s Secretary of State, so that voters will realize—in 
theory—that Senator X received large donations from an Exxon-funded 
PAC.  If, however, Exxon were to go with option three, it would not have 
to disclose its donation.  Exxon can spend $1 million to get Senator X 
elected and the public would be none the wiser.  This is dark money.  It is 
the money funneled into political campaigns by anonymous, wealthy 
donors.7 
Loose campaign finance regulations can result in political candidates 
benefiting from enormous sums of dark money from unknown 
corporations, labor unions, and wealthy individuals.  For example, Arizona 
Governor Doug Ducey benefited from $8.2 million in spending by dark 
money groups during his 2014 campaign.8  Unsurprisingly, in 2016, 
Governor Ducey signed into law Senate Bill 1516,9 which loosened state 
control over anonymous campaign donations and made numerous changes 
to Arizona campaign finance law.10  Governor Ducey says this law is “the 
first step in simplifying our laws and regulations to provide 
more opportunity for participation in the political process and increased 
freedom of speech.”11  Opponents of the bill, such as Democratic State 
Senator Steve Farley, believe “[i]t quashes [political] participation for 
 
 7  When I say the donors are “anonymous,” I only mean to say that the public at-large 
does not know who made the donation.  The politician receiving the donation is often fully 
aware of the donor’s identity.   
 8  Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey Signs ‘Dark-Money’ Bill, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
(March 31, 2016), available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2016/03/31/arizona-gov-doug-ducey-
signs-darkmoney-bill/82492558/.  
 9  See generally S.B. 1516, 52d Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016).   
 10  Pitzl, supra note 8.  
 11  Id.  
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anyone who. . .doesn’t have the ‘price of admission.’”12 
In most States, little can be done to deter dark money donations.  The 
only recourse would be to change state law to require disclosure from 
501(c)(4) organizations.  However, that route is often a dead-end: why 
would a politician benefiting from these tax-exempt super-donors want to 
encumber his cash flow?  Arizona, however, is not like most states.  Under 
the title “Campaign Contributions and Expenditures; Publicity,” Article 7, 
§ 16 of the Arizona Constitution requires “[t]he legislature, at its first 
session, [to] enact a law providing for a general publicity . . . of all 
campaign contributions to, and expenditures of campaign committees and 
candidates for public office.”13  I will often refer to Article 7, § 16 as the 
“General Publicity Clause.” 
The Arizona courts never had an opportunity to interpret this 
provision.  However, this is one of the many provisions in Arizona’s 
Constitution designed to “ensure that the citizen’s right to cast his vote [is] 
meaningful and [that] elections [are] pure.”14  It is clear from the text of the 
Arizona Constitution that the framers were fearful of corruption in 
government.15  And they were especially concerned about the influence 
corporations could have on elections.16  Unlike most state charters, 
Arizona’s Constitution makes it “unlawful for any corporation . . . to make 
any contribution of money or anything of value for the purpose of 
influencing any election . . . .”17 
The framers, however, could not have imagined the intricacy of 
today’s campaign finance laws, and they certainly could not have foreseen 
the rise of dark money, emanating from tax-exempt social welfare 
organizations.  This is why they placed a continuing duty on the State’s 
Legislature to “enact . . . law[s] providing for a general publicity. . .of all 
 
 12  Id.  
 13  Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 16.  
 14  John Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 68 (1988) 
(further noting that the framers were especially concerned about corporate influence on 
elections).  
 15  See Ariz. Const. art. VIII (allowing for liberal recall of public officials); Ariz. Const. 
art. IV, § 1(3) (giving the People referendum power); Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 1(2) (giving the 
people the power of initiative); Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 1(6) (protecting voter initiatives and 
referenda from government veto, repeal, amendment, and diversion of funds); Ariz. Const. 
art. IV, § 23 (forbidding “any person holding public office” from accepting a special pass or 
privilege from a corporation); Ariz. Const. art. XXII, § 14 (“Any law which may be enacted 
by the Legislature. . .may be enacted by the people under [an] Initiative.”).  See also Leshy, 
supra note 14, at 65–70.  
 16  Leshy, supra note 14, at 68–69.   
 17  Ariz. Const. art. XIV, § 18.  Today, this provision is undoubtedly invalid given the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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campaign contributions . . . and expenditures . . . .”18 
The Legislature, however, has woefully shirked this duty.  Rather than 
enacting laws requiring “publicity” of campaign contributions, the 
Legislature has made Arizona “ground zero for dark money campaigns.”19  
This Article argues that several of Arizona’s pro-dark-money statutes 
violate Article 7, § 16 of the Arizona Constitution.  More specifically, this 
Article argues that A.R.S. § 16-901(43) and A.R.S. § 16-911(B) are 
unconstitutional under the General Publicity Clause. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts.  Campaign finance law is littered 
with terms of art and unnecessary legal jargon—e.g., 501(c)(4)s, PACs, 
super-PACs, etc.  To make this Article as readable as possible, Part I 
provides “definitions and explanations” of recurring legal terms.  Part II 
gives an overview of the history of Arizona campaign finance law.  Part III 
shows how several of Arizona’s campaign finance statutes violate the 
Arizona Constitution.  Part IV discusses potential justiciability concerns 
that may arise when challenging these dark money statutes.  And Part V 
addresses likely counterarguments to this Article. 
The political philosopher Ronald Dworkin once said, “Our politics are 
a disgrace, and money is the root of the problem.”20  My hope is that this 
Article will contribute, in some way, no matter how small, to reigning in 
dark money in Arizona elections. 
II. DEFINITIONS & EXPLANATIONS 
Campaign finance law—especially as it relates to the tax code—is a 
notoriously convoluted subject.  For this reason, this section defines several 
important terms used throughout this Article in (somewhat) easy-to-
understand language. 
A. Political Action Committees (PACs) 
A product of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, PACs are 
political organizations that directly support a candidate or ballot measure.21  
PACs are the primary financing mechanisms for the political activity of all 
politicians.22  “They are the vehicles through which money is collected and 
 
 18  See Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 16.  
 19  Roberts, supra note 2.  
 20  RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 
351 (2000).  
 21  See Gregory J. Krieg, What is a Super PAC? A Short History, ABC NEWS, Aug. 9, 
2012, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/super-pac-short-
history/story?id=16960267.  
 22  See JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 652 (2012).  
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through which money is spent” in political campaigns.23 
Under Arizona law, an entity must register as a PAC if (1) it is 
organized for the primary purpose of influencing elections and (2) it 
receives or spends over $1,000 in connection with any election during a 
calendar year.24  A PAC is any group that spends an above-average amount 
of money in election cycles.  Prior to 2010, individuals were not allowed to 
give more than $2,500 to PACs, and corporations and labor unions were 
strictly forbidden from making donations.25  In 2010, however, Citizens 
United and SpeechNow cleared the way for “independent-expenditure-
only” groups, or super-PACs, to spend vast amounts of money in election 
cycles. 
B. Super-PACs & Mega-PACs 
Super-PACs (or, in Arizona, mega-PACs) are political organizations 
that do not make direct contributions to candidates or political parties, but 
instead make independent expenditures in an effort to support or defeat a 
candidate or ballot measure.26  These groups may raise unlimited sums of 
money from corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals and may spend 
unlimited sums of money to influence the outcomes of elections.27  They 
may not, however, coordinate with a candidate for political office.28  Super-
PACs are the product of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
SpeechNow v. FEC,29 which relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Citizens United.30  In Arizona, super-PACs are called “mega-
PACs.”31  A PAC qualifies for mega-PAC status if it “receives at least ten 
dollars in contributions from at least five hundred individuals” over a four-
year period.32 
Mega-PACs can raise and spend unlimited money to influence 
election outcomes.33  The downside to being labeled a mega-PAC, 
however, is that, as opposed to traditional PACs, mega-PACs cannot 
 
 23  Id.  
 24  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-905(B) (2016). 
 25  Krieg, supra note 21.  
 26  McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 n. 2 (2014).  
 27  Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1647 (2012).   
 28  See generally Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 88 (2013).  
 29  SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 30  See id. at 692–96.  
 31  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-908 (2016).  Mega-PACs used to be called super-PACs.  But 
in 2016, SB 1516 changed the names without explanation.  One reason may be because of 
the negative connotation associated with the term “super-PAC.”  
 32  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-908(B) (2016). 
 33  Id. 
LINDVALL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:01 PM 
2020] ENDING DARK MONEY IN ARIZONA 67 
coordinate with candidates and cannot donate money directly to a 
candidate’s campaign—all expenditures must be independent.34 
This non-coordination requirement, however, is largely 
unenforceable.35  The FEC does not have the time, resources, or inclination 
to enforce this non-coordination requirement.  For this reason, supposedly 
independent super-PACs can be run by a candidate’s close associates, 
friends, and former staff.36  For example, when Stephen Colbert ran for 
“President of South Carolina,” his close friend Jon Stewart was in charge of 
running his super-PAC, which was sarcastically—and appropriately—
renamed the “Definitely Not Coordinating with Stephen super PAC.”37 
C. 501(c)(4) Organizations 
A 501(c)(4) organization is a tax-exempt organization that is meant to 
promote “social welfare.”38  These organizations can collect and spend 
unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns, so long as the 
organization’s primary purpose is not to influence the outcomes of 
elections.39  They do not have to disclose their donors.40 
There are certain organizations that are—at least in theory—so 
intrinsically valuable that we as a society have decided to provide them 
with certain tax breaks.  Organizations that meet certain qualifications earn 
“tax-exempt” status in the eyes of the almighty Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS).  Those qualifications, in large part, are laid out in 26 U.S.C. § 
501(c).41  “Teachers’ retirement fund associations,” for example, are tax-
exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(11). 
In the campaign finance world, the most important 501(c) 
organizations are those which receive tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4).  
Section 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status is reserved for non-profit “[c]ivic 
 
 34  Gardner & Charles, supra note 22, at 654.   
 35  See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, The Brave New World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 
101 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 591 (2016) (noting that “campaign finance observers . . . widely 
agree . . . that the legal definition of formal coordination is entirely opaque at the moment 
and laughably easy to circumvent . . . .”).  
 36  See, e.g., Trevor Potter, Here’s What I Learned When I Helped Stephen Colbert Set 
Up his Super PAC, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2015. 
 37  Neda Ulaby, Stephen Colbert Wants You To Know: That’s Definitely Not His 
SuperPAC, NPR, (Jan. 20, 2015), available at 
http://www.npr.org/sections/monkeysee/2012/01/20/145475089/stephen-colbert-wants-you-
to-know-thats-definitely-not-his-superpac.  
 38  26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2016).  
 39  See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a).  
 40  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
22 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221nc.pdf (last accessed Nov. 28, 
2019).   
 41  Title 26 of the United States Code is dedicated to the “Internal Revenue Code.”  
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leagues or organizations” that operate “exclusively for the promotion of 
social welfare.”42  Some well-known 501(c)(4) organizations are the 
National Rifle Association (NRA), Planned Parenthood, and the Sierra 
Club.  Spending by 501(c)(4) organizations has exploded in recent years.43  
During the 2006 presidential election, for example, 501(c)(4) groups spent 
approximately $5 million; and during the 2012 election, they spent 
approximately $310 million.44 
For the purposes of this Article, 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations 
are important in at least two respects: (1) they may collect and spend 
unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns, so long as influencing 
elections is not the group’s “primary purpose”; and (2) they do not have to 
disclose their donors’ identities.45  These organizations are the source of 
“dark money” (defined below). 
For example, one of the most notorious 501(c)(4) organizations is 
Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS.46  Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Citizens United, Crossroads GPS has raised more than $330 million from 
unknown donors, and it has spent approximately $112 million for the 
explicit purpose of influencing the outcomes of elections.47  Critics of 
Rove’s Crossroads GPS correctly note that it is “anything but a ‘social 
welfare’ organization; it is a political organization formed and operated to 
influence federal elections.”48 
Under federal law, a 501(c)(4) organization loses its tax-exempt status 
if its “primary purpose” is to influence the outcomes of political elections.49  
(As referenced above, it is no coincidence that Karl Rove raised $330 
million but spent only $112 million—if the organization spent much more, 
it could potentially lose its tax-exempt status.).  This is very important for 
the purposes of this Article, because, as of 2016, Arizona chose to exempt 
501(c) organizations from the “primary purpose” requirement under state 
law.50  Under Arizona law, so long as the organization “has tax exempt 
 
 42  26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2016).  
 43  Thomas B. Edsall, Dark Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2013. 
 44  Id.  
 45  Sean Sullivan, What is a 501(c)(4), Anyway?, WASH. POST, May 13, 2013.  
 46  Id.  
 47  Matea Gold, IRS Approves Tax-Exempt Status of Crossroads GPS After More than 
Five Years, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2016.  
 48  Id.  
 49  See Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. 
Elections & How 2012 Became the “Dark Money” Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 383, 419, 463 (2013) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976)).  If an 
organization’s “primary purpose” was to influence elections, it would be considered a 
“political committee” and would be forced to disclose its donors.  Id.   
 50  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-901(43) (2016) (“[A]n entity is not organized for the primary 
purpose of influencing an election if . . . [t]he entity has tax exempt status under [§] 501(a) 
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status under [§] 501(a) of the internal revenue code,” it is, by definition, 
“not organized for the primary purpose of influencing . . . election[s].”51 
This statute—A.R.S. § 16-901(43)—serves as a welcome mat for dark 
money in Arizona.  Now, so long as an organization remains in good 
standing with the IRS, it can spend unlimited amounts of money to 
influence Arizona elections and never have to report a single donor.52  Part 
III of this Article explains why this law is unconstitutional. 
D. Hard Money 
Hard money is money donated directly to politicians.  Hard money is 
strictly regulated: donors must be disclosed; donations are capped; and 
donations may not be accepted in exchange for an “official action.”53  Hard 
money, in other words, is the money that goes directly into a candidate’s 
political war chest.54  Hard money—at least when properly regulated—is 
not a bad thing.  For many, making a hard-money donation is the most 
effective way to show their support for a candidate or to support a ballot 
measure. 
E. Soft Money 
Soft money is money that is not given directly to a politician but is 
still used to benefit their campaign.  The money spent by independent 
expenditure committees (super-PACs) and 501(c)(4) organizations is soft 
money.55  This money does not go directly into the candidate’s campaign 
coffers, but it still benefits the candidate.  During campaign season, if one 
sees an attack ad that ends with “this message was paid for by Americans 
for Prosperity,” or something similar, that is a perfect example of soft 
money.  It is money spent by politically minded groups to influence the 
outcome of an election but is not given directly to a candidate.  Super-
PACs and 501(c)(4) organizations, essentially, always spend “soft” money 
on political campaigns. 
 
of the internal revenue code.”).   
 51  Id.  
 52  As an aside, this law was passed strictly along partisan lines, with only Republicans 
voting in favor of its passing.  Republicans, in turn, gave the power to regulate these non-
profit political organizations back to the federal government—not only to the federal 
government, but to the IRS: the organization that was recently entangled in a scandal for 
directly targeting conservative 501(c) groups.  Arizona Republicans, generally, have an 
overwhelming distrust for the federal government.  Yet Arizona Senate Republicans have 
chosen to give the federal government ultimate oversight over the transparency of our 
election process?  Is this real life? 
 53  Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/dark-
money/basics (last visited July 3, 2017).   
 54  See id.  
 55  Id.   
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F. Dark Money 
Dark money is money that is spent on political campaigns from 
undisclosed donors, usually through tax-exempt 501(c)(4) organizations.  
Former Arizona House Majority Whip Chris Herstam called dark money 
“the most corrupting influence [he’d] seen” in his thirty-three-year stint in 
Arizona politics.56  Dark money works like this: a corporation, union, or 
wealthy individual donates large sums of money to a 501(c)(4) 
organization.57  That 501(c)(4) then donates that money to a super-
PAC.58  That super-PAC then spends that money to influence the outcome 
of an upcoming election.59  And because 501(c)(4)s do not have to disclose 
their donors, the public will never know where this money came 
from.60  The super-PAC would have to report the contribution from the 
501(c)(4), but not the contributions made to the 501(c)(4).61  Thus, dark 
money is created.62 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARIZONA’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 
The “Four Walls” of Arizona Campaign Finance Regulations 
Fear of money’s corrupting influence is not a novel concept.  As 
Claudius said in Hamlet, “In the corrupted currents of this world, 
[o]ffense’s gilded hand may shove by justice, [a]nd oft . . . [b]uys out the 
law.”63  Similarly, in 1910, in his famous speech in Osawatomie, Kansas, 
Teddy Roosevelt said: 
There can be no effective control of corporations 
while their political activity remains.  To put an end to it 
will be neither a short nor an easy task, but it can be 
done . . . .  Corporate expenditures for political purposes, 
and especially such expenditures by public-service 
corporations, have supplied one of the principal sources of 
corruption in our political affairs.64 
The term “dark money” may be new, but the governed always feared 
it. 
 
 56  Lee et al., supra note 3, at 2.   
 57  David J. Cantelme, Arizona Campaign Finance Laws are Teetering, 51 AZ 
ATTORNEY 36, 36 (2015); see also Dark Money Basics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics (last visited July 3, 2017).   
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id.  
 62  See, e.g., id. 
 63  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 3. 
 64  The full text of Roosevelt’s speech can be found at Eric Black, Teddy Roosevelt’s 
Attack on Excessive Concentration of Wealth, MINN. POST, Dec. 7, 2011. 
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As such, Arizona had a sturdy edifice of campaign finance regulations 
prior to the Roberts Court’s dismantling of traditional campaign finance 
law.65  The integrity of Arizona’s elections was protected by four statutory 
walls: (1) registration requirements; (2) contribution limits; (3) strict 
disclosure requirements; and (4) publicly funded resource-matching laws.66 
The campaign registration laws required all candidates and 
committees to register with Arizona’s Secretary of State.  The State also 
imposed relatively low contribution limits (which increased over time to 
account for inflation).  Non-candidate political committees—today, what 
we would call PACs and super-PACs—were required to file disclosure 
reports with the Secretary of State, listing their donors, the donors’ 
contributions, and how that money was spent influencing the election(s).  
Further, Arizona’s fund-matching provisions publicly financed certain 
eligible candidates to ensure that elections were financially competitive.  
Several of these walls, however, have been demolished; and those that 
remain rest on a shaky foundation. 
A. Political Spending & Citizens United 
The first of these walls to crumble was Arizona’s campaign-
contribution limits.  In 2009, one year before Citizens United, Arizona law 
forbade super-PACs from donating more than $1,664 to a legislative 
campaign, and individual contributions were capped at $410 per 
candidate.67  Then came Citizens United.68  There, the Supreme Court, 
unprompted, held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
setting caps on independent expenditures.69  “[I]ndependent expenditures,” 
the Court held, “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”70  Because candidates are not allowed to coordinate with 
independent expenditure committees, Justice Kennedy argued, that negates 
the possibility that independent expenditures will result in the sort of quid 
pro quo corruption the government can legitimately prohibit.71  With that, 
corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals were free to spend unlimited 
 
 65  See Cantelme, supra note 57, at 36.  
 66  Id. at 36.   
 67  2009–2010 Contribution Limits, ARIZ. SECRETARY OF STATE (Aug. 14, 2009), 
http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2010/Info/Campaign_Contribution_Limits_2010.htm.  
 68  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 69  Id. at 357–61.   
 70  Id. at 357.  This holding is one of the most criticized in the history of the Supreme 
Court.  See, e.g., id. at 393–480 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael S. Kang, The End of 
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and 
the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Conservatives Embrace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2010.   
 71  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357–61.   
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amounts of money to influence the outcomes of elections.72 
B. Fund-Matching & Bennett 
The second of these walls to fall was Arizona’s fund-matching 
program.  Arizona, like most states, discovered that contribution limits, 
standing alone, are not enough to quell political corruption.  Five years 
after the enactment of these limits, Arizona suffered “the worst public 
corruption scandal in its history.”73  In that scandal, known as “AZ Scam,” 
nearly 10% of Arizona’s legislators were caught accepting campaign 
contributions or bribes in exchange for supporting legislation.74  Following 
that incident, Arizona voters decided that further reform was necessary. 
Accordingly, in 1998, Arizonans, through initiative, passed the 
Citizens Clean Elections Act.75  That Act, in part, allowed certain eligible 
candidates running for political office to receive “equalizing” funds from 
the State Treasury.76  In many instances, the Act required the State to 
equalize the candidates’ campaign war chests (for example, if privately-
funded “Candidate A” raised $1 million and super-PACs ran $500,000 
worth of ads supporting him, the State would give publicly-funded 
“Candidate B” $1.5 million to level the playing field).77 
In 2011, however, in Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, the U.S. 
Supreme Court gutted Arizona’s fund-matching program.  “Laws like 
Arizona’s matching funds provision that inhibit robust and wide-open 
political debate without sufficient justification cannot stand,” the Court 
held.78  Because spending and raising money could cause a privately-
financed candidate’s opponent to receive additional state money, the law 
forced these privately-financed candidates to “shoulder a special and 
potentially significant burden when choosing [whether] to exercise 
[their] First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of [their] 
candidacy.”79  And with that, the primary provision of the Citizens Clean 
Elections Act was declared unconstitutional, and Arizona’s second wall of 
 
 72  In 2016, for example, George Soros alone spent over $2 million in a successful effort 
to dethrone Maricopa County Sherriff Joe Arpaio.  Scott Bland, Soros Spends $2 Million to 
Defeat Arpaio, POLITICO, Nov. 4, 2016.   
 73  Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 761 
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 74  Id.  
 75  Id. at 728. 
 76  Id. at 729 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-952(A), (B), and (C)(4)–(5), which 
provided for the “[e]qual funding of candidates”). 
 77  See id. at 729–32.  
 78  Id. at 755.  It is wholly unclear how making elections more competitive “inhibit[s] 
robust and wide-open political debate,” and it blinks reality to baldly assert that Arizona 
lacked a “sufficient justification” for its fund-matching provisions.   
 79  Id. at 737 (internal quotes omitted).   
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protection fell. 
C. Disclosure Requirements & SB 1516 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the government has a 
compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption in our democratic processes.80  As such, the states can—and 
should—require the disclosure of political donors.  Even the Citizens 
United Court noted that “disclosure . . . can provide shareholders and 
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected 
officials accountable for their positions and supporters.”81 
Prior to 2016, Arizona’s disclosure laws were not perfect, but they 
were at least reasonably tailored to ensure the public knew who financed 
Arizona’s political campaigns.82  In 2016, Governor Ducey signed Senate 
Bill 151683 into law.  If allowed to stand, SB 1516 could effectively tear 
down a third campaign finance wall: the disclosure requirement.  In short, 
SB 1516—which is currently codified in Title 16 of the Arizona Revised 
Statutes—is one of the most pro-dark-money statutes imaginable.84 
SB 1516 overhauled Arizona’s campaign finance law in three ways.  
First, it changed the definition of “contribution” to exclude things such as 
travel expenses,85 the use of real or personal property,86 or the payment of 
legal expenses.87  Thus, under a plain reading of this statute, a corporation 
could fly a politician to the CEO’s house on a private jet, wine and dine 
him, and send him back with the knowledge that the corporation plans to 
make a hefty donation to a politically-minded 501(c)(4) that supports 
him—and none of this would have to be disclosed.88 
Second, it raised the standard for proving coordination between 
 
 80  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 
724, 741 (2008); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67, 72 (1976).   
 81  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.   
 82  Cf. Cantelme, supra note 57, at 36–37.   
 83  2016 Ariz. ALS 79, 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws 79, 2016 Ariz. Ch. 79, 2016 Ariz. SB 
1516.  The text of SB 1516 can be found at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/52leg/2r/bills/sb1516s.pdf.  
 84  See, e.g., Ann M. Ravel, States Can Bring Political ‘Dark Money’ Into the Light, 
L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2016 (noting that Arizona’s dark money problem is “particularly 
egregious” and that SB 1516 shows “Arizona doesn’t recognize how [the rise in dark 
money] is undermining its elections”); Laurie Roberts, Roll Call: Who Supported Expanding 
Dark Money in Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 18, 2016; Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona ‘Dark 
Money’ Bill on its Way to Gov. Doug Ducey, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, March 29, 2016.  
 85  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B)(1)(a) (2016).   
 86  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B)(1)(b) (2016).  
 87  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B)(6)(c) (2016).  
 88  Cf. Pitzl, supra note 84.   
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politicians and independent expenditure committees.89  Prior to SB 1516, 
prosecuting agencies needed only “reasonable cause” of wrongdoing to 
charge a politician for coordinating with an independent expenditure 
committee.90  SB 1516, added an “intent” element to this burden of proof.91  
This makes proving—and stopping—unlawful coordination much more 
difficult. 
Finally, it removed the “primary purpose” requirement for 501(c)(4) 
organizations.  The federal government only determines whether a non-
profit organization gets “tax-exempt” status under the Internal Revenue 
Code; it is not a political regulatory agency.92  The IRS is concerned only 
with collecting taxes, not policing organizations’ political activities.93  The 
states, accordingly, are primarily in charge of regulating these 
organizations through their police powers.94 
SB 1516, however, gave much of this regulatory power back to the 
IRS.  Now, under Arizona law, a 501(c)(4), by definition, is not organized 
for the primary purpose of influencing an election if it remains in good 
standing with the IRS.95  In other words, Arizona is asking the IRS to act as 
the overseer of its dark money groups.  The IRS, however, is not capable of 
such a regulatory task,96 nor does it have the inclination to do so given its 
recent regulatory scandals.97  In 2013, the IRS was wrapped in scandal for 
its treatment of conservative “Tea Party” organizations.98  As a result, the 
IRS has largely stepped aside as a political regulator—and has made this 
fact publicly known.99 
What this statute means in practice is that it is open season for dark 
money groups in Arizona.  In an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times, former 
FEC Commissioner Ann Ravel chastised Arizona for failing to see the 
extent to which dark money is undermining the integrity of its electoral 
 
 89  Id.   
 90  Id.  
 91  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-922(B)(2)(b).  
 92  Linda Sugin, Nonprofit Oversight Under Siege: Politics, Disclosure, and State Law 
Solutions for 501(c)(4) Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 895, 896–97 (2016). 
 93  Id.  
 94  Id.  
 95  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-901(42).   
 96  Sugin, supra note 92, at 897 (noting that the IRS is a revenue-collector, not a 
political regulator).  
 97  See generally Evelyn Brody & Marcus Owens, Exile to Main Street: The IRS’s 
Diminished Role in Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859 
(2016).   
 98  Id. 
 99  See Eric Lichtblau, I.R.S. Expected to Stand Aside as Nonprofits Increase Role in 
2016 Race, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2015.   
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process.100  Ravel cited SB 1516 as evidence that the Arizona Legislature 
either does not know or does not care about the corrupting effect of dark 
money.101 
Being from California, Ravel had good standing to level these 
accusations, because in 2014, Arizona prompted California to adopt the 
most expansive political disclosure requirements in the country, designed 
to shed light on politically-minded 501(c)(4) organizations.102  These 
statutes were prompted by the overreach of Arizona dark money groups 
into California politics.103  In 2013, two Arizona 501(c)(4) organizations—
Americans for Responsible Leadership and the Center to Protect Patient 
Rights—contributed $11 million to a California-based PAC to support a 
ballot measure that would curb unions’ political fundraising capabilities.104  
Thanks to this funding, that initiative passed.  Because the money was 
filtered through a 501(c)(4), Californians remained unaware of the 
revenue’s source.  
In response to this out-of-state meddling, California passed SB 27, 
requiring “multipurpose organizations”—such as 501(c)(4)s—to disclose 
the identity of their donors in mandatory state filings.105  The Bill’s sponsor 
stated that its purpose was to prohibit “[the] laundering [of] campaign cash 
through nonprofits to hide one’s true identity.”106  Arizona’s dark money 
problem is so bad that its spillover is causing neighboring states to pass 
laws to protect the integrity of their political processes.107  The Arizona 
 
 100  Ravel, supra note 84.  
 101  Id.  
 102  See Cal. Gov. Code § 84222; Sugin, supra note 92, at 904.  
 103  Patrick Ford, Chapter 16: Combating Dark Money in California Politics, 
46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2014).  
 104  Sugin, supra note 92, at 904, n.61.  The Center to Protect Patient Rights is a 
501(c)(4) organization funded by the infamous Koch brothers.  DAVID R. BERMAN, DARK 
MONEY IN ARIZONA: THE RIGHT TO KNOW, FREE SPEECH AND PLAYING WHACK-A-MOLE 4 
(2014) (published by Arizona State University’s Morrison Institute for Public Policy), 
available at 
https://morrisoninstitute.asu.edu/sites/default/files/content/products/DarkMoney.pdf.  
 105  S.B. 27, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).  More importantly, the law “attempts to 
follow the daisy chain of contributions from one exempt organization to another,” requiring 
disclosure by each organization in the chain.  Sugin, supra note 92, at 905.  S.B. 27 is now 
codified, in part, in Cal. Gov. Code § 84222. 
 106  Brian Joseph, O.C. Senator Introduces Bill to Illuminate “Dark Money”, ORANGE 
COUNTY REG. (Dec. 4, 2012).  The Bill’s sponsor was Sen. Lou Correa.  The California 
Political Practices Commission also commented that this Bill’s “disclosure of donors 
provides voters with vital information on who is funding campaigns [and] increases 
transparency to deter actual or perceived corruption. . .”  Cal. Fair Political Practices 
Comm’n, Multipurpose Organizations Reporting Political Spending 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.fppc.ca.gov/content/dam/fppc/NS-
Documents/TAD/Campaign%20Documents/Multipurpose%20Organizations.pdf.  
 107  See generally Sugin, supra note 92, at 904–07; Ford, supra note 103, at 339–54.   
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Legislature, however, has remained recalcitrant, despite its constitutional 
obligation to act. 
IV. A.R.S. § 16-901(43) AND A.R.S. § 16-911(B) VIOLATE ARTICLE 7, § 16 
OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTION 
The Arizona Legislature has not only shirked its duty to provide for a 
“general publicity” of campaign expenditures and contributions, it has 
passed legislation that further obscures and conceals the source of 
campaign funding.  A.R.S. § 16-901(43) emboldens and deregulates 
501(c)(4) organizations, thereby setting the stage for a surge in dark 
money.  A.R.S. § 16-911(B) sets forth an extremely narrow definition of 
what amounts to a political “contribution,” thereby allowing bribe-like 
activity to go undisclosed.  These two provisions are directly contradict the 
General Publicity Clause. 
A. The Text of the Unconstitutional Statutes 
1. A.R.S. § 16-901(43) 
A.R.S. § 16-901(43) provides the definition of an organization’s 
“primary purpose.”  (Remember, an organization’s primary purpose 
determines whether that organization receives tax-exempt status in the eyes 
of the IRS.  More specifically, a 501(c)(4) organization loses its tax-exempt 
status if its primary purpose is to influence election outcomes.)  Section 16-
901(43) provides: “[A]n entity is not organized for the primary purpose of 
influencing an election if . . . [t]he entity has tax exempt status under [§] 
501(a) of the internal revenue code.”108  In other words, all 501(c)(4) 
organizations, by definition, are not organized for the primary purpose of 
influencing elections.  This means that 501(c)(4) organizations—like Karl 
Rove’s Crossroads GPS, the NRA, and Planned Parenthood—can spend 
unlimited amounts of money on Arizona campaigns as long as the IRS does 
not say otherwise.  Further, as the Arizona Legislature knew when they 
passed this law, the IRS has largely abdicated its enforcement 
responsibilities.109 
2. A.R.S. § 16-911(B) 
Under Arizona law, politicians must disclose any “contributions” they 
receive.  A.R.S. § 16-911(B), however, changed the definition of what 
qualifies as a “contribution.”  Section 16-911(B) provides, in part: “The 
following are not contributions: (1) The value of an individual’s volunteer 
 
 108  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-901(43)(a) (2016). 
 109  Potter & Morgan, supra note 49, at 466–67; Lichtblau, supra note 99.  
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services . . . including . . . : (a) travel expenses; (b) use of real or personal 
property; (c) cost of invitations, food or beverages; . . . .”110 
Under a plain reading of this statute, a corporation could fly a 
politician to a private fundraiser (“travel expenses”) on a private jet (the 
“use of personal property”), wine and dine him (the “cost of . . . food [and] 
beverages”), and inform him that the corporation intends to make a sizeable 
donation to a supportive 501(c)(4) organization, yet none of this would 
ever have to be reported because the corporation did not “contribute” to 
him.  Something is wrong with this picture. 
Contrast this with the federal government’s definition, which defines a 
“contribution” as any “gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of 
money or anything of value made . . . for the purpose of influencing any 
election for Federal office.”111 
B. Interpreting Article 7, § 16 
The courts have never had an opportunity to interpret Article 7, § 
16.112  The section’s meaning, therefore, is not precisely known.  Judges, 
however, have a set of legal tools they can employ to determine what is 
required by a constitutional provision.  Specifically, when determining the 
proper meaning of a constitutional provision, judges should look to the 
provision’s (i) text, (ii) history, and (iii) purpose, along with (iv) the 
potential consequences of a particular interpretation.113  Each of these 
considerations will be discussed in turn. 
1. The text of Article 7, § 16 
Article 7, § 16 reads as follows: 
The legislature, at its first session, shall enact a law providing for a 
general publicity, before and after election, of all campaign contributions 
to, and expenditures of campaign committees and candidates for public 
office.114 
Most of this provision’s requirements can be gathered from its text: it 
requires the Legislature to “enact a law” that provides for “a general 
 
 110  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-911(B) (2016). 
 111  2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).  
 112  JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 244 (2d ed. 2013).   
 113  Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 672 (Ariz. 1994) (noting that the courts 
will use a provision’s “context; its language, subject matter, and historical background; its 
effects and consequences; and its spirit and purpose” when interpreting ambiguous 
language); Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (Ariz. 1991) (same); State v. Korzep, 
799 P.2d 831, 834 (Ariz. 1990) (same); see also STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR 
DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 74 (2010) (arguing that a judge’s interpretational tools 
are text, history, tradition, precedent, purpose, and consequences).   
 114  Ariz. Const. art. VII, § 16. 
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publicity” of “campaign contributions. . .and expenditures.”  Campaign 
“contributions” and “expenditures” are quite well-defined.115  Contributions 
are money donations made directly to a political campaign, and 
expenditures refer to the campaign’s spending of money to win the 
election.  Ambiguity arises, however, when determining what is meant by 
the “general publicity” requirement.  To determine what is meant by “a 
general publicity,” we must look to the provision’s history and purpose. 
2. The history of the General Publicity Clause 
The General Publicity Clause was ratified as an original part of the 
Arizona Constitution in 1912.  Throughout the century preceding 
ratification, the costs of elections had risen dramatically mirroring the rise 
of corporations in American economic life.116  Further, in many states, 
politicians and corporate executives had an unsettling symbiotic 
relationship.  Several years before Arizona was admitted to the Union, 
Senator Boies Penrose, a prominent Republican from Pennsylvania, said of 
the corporation/politician relationship: 
I believe in the division of labor: You send us to 
Congress; we pass laws under which you make money . . . 
and out of your profits, you further contribute to our 
campaign funds to send us back again to pass more laws to 
enable you to make more money.117 
The framers of the Arizona Constitution were keenly aware of corrupt 
behavior like Penrose’s when they authored the General Publicity Clause—
indeed, all of Article 7.118 
Just five years before Arizona became a state, Congress passed the 
Tillman Act, which prohibited “any corporation” from “mak[ing] a money 
contribution in . . . any election to any political office . . . .”119  Two years 
before Arizona was admitted to statehood, Congress passed the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which required candidates for Congress to 
disclose the names of their contributors and amounts of expenditures before 
and after their elections.120 
 
 115  See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–36 (1976) (defining and 
distinguishing “contributions” and “expenditures” for First Amendment purposes).  
 116  Gardner & Charles, supra note 22, at 638.  
 117  Id.  
 118  See Leshy, supra note 14, at 68 (noting that the framers were particularly worried 
about corporations’ corrupting influences in elections).  See also Ariz. Const. art. XIV, § 18 
(forbidding corporations from contributing to political campaigns); Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 
19(13) (forbidding politicians from accepting any special pass or privilege from a 
corporation). 
 119  Gardner & Charles, supra note 22, at 638–39. 
 120  Id. at 639.   
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Shortly after Arizona was admitted to statehood, Senator Joe Robison 
made the following statement on the Senate floor: 
We all know . . . that one of the great political evils of 
the time is the apparent hold on political parties [that] 
business interests and certain organizations . . . obtain by 
reason of liberal campaign contributions.  Many believe 
that when an individual or association of individuals makes 
large contributions for the purpose of aiding candidates of 
political parties in winning the elections, they expect, and 
sometimes demand, and occasionally, at least, receive, 
consideration by the beneficiaries of their 
contributions . . . .121 
Put simply, the framers drafted the Arizona Constitution during a 
revolutionary period in the history of campaign finance reform; and the 
language of Article 7 reflects that. 
3. The Purpose of the General Publicity Clause 
Article 7, § 16 is meant to create “a general publicity” of campaign 
contributions and expenditures.  But what was this provision meant to 
accomplish?  John Leshy—who is arguably the leading authority on the 
Arizona Constitution—has noted that Article 7 is generally meant to 
“ensure that the citizen’s right to cast his vote [is] meaningful and that 
elections [are] pure.”122  When read in light of the other provisions of 
Article 7, it is apparent that the General Publicity Clause is meant to serve 
as a mechanism for keeping the voting public informed as to who is 
financing Arizona’s political campaigns. 
The framers of the Arizona Constitution were particularly fearful of 
corporations influencing Arizona elections.123  Arizona has a distinct fourth 
branch of government—the Corporation Commission—whose primary 
purpose is to regulate and monitor corporate activity.124  The crux of Article 
7 is to limit corporate influence of Arizona elections, and the only fair 
reading of the General Publicity Clause is the one that concludes that the 
framers wanted to make Arizona elections as transparent as possible. 
 
 121  United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers Of 
America, 352 U.S. 567, 576 (1957) (citing 65 Cong. Rec. 9507–08).  
 122  Leshy, supra note 14, at 68.  
 123  Id. (noting that the framers were particularly worried about corporations’ corrupting 
influences in elections).  See also Ariz. Const. art. XIV, § 18 (forbidding corporations from 
contributing to political campaigns); Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 19(13) (forbidding politicians 
from accepting any special pass or privilege from a corporation). 
 124  See generally Ariz. Const. art. XV (entitled “The Corporation Commission”).  
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4. The Consequences of Leaving the Contested Statutes in Place 
Continuing to allow dark money to flood Arizona elections could 
further erode the public’s trust in government.  In a democracy where 
representatives were beholden to their constituents, voting for SB 1516 
would have been political suicide.  In Arizona, however, where dark money 
reigns, voting for this Bill was politically prudent—it further allowed 
anonymous donors to funnel millions of dollars into politicians’ campaign 
coffers. 
Polling data shows that the vast majority of Arizonans opposed SB 
1516 and other similar bills.  In March 2016, several months before SB 
1516 was signed into law, ProgressNow Arizona conducted a survey to 
gauge public opinion on SB 1516 and similar bills being considered in the 
State House of Representatives.  That survey found that just 17% of 
Arizona voters supported SB 1516 after hearing the arguments against it, 
and 81% of voters said they would be less likely to vote for a candidate 
who supported the Bill.125  In a New York Times poll, over 80% of those 
interviewed believed money played too large a roll in state and federal 
elections, and 67% said that wealthy Americans have a disproportionate 
chance of influencing elected representatives.126  That poll further noted 
that 75% of self-identified Republicans supported stronger disclosure 
laws.127  Yet in both Arizona and Washington, D.C., “Republican leaders in 
[the Legislature] have blocked legislation to require more disclosure by 
political nonprofit groups, which do not reveal the names of their 
donors.”128 
Dark money and its corrupting influence are clearly problems in 
desperate need of correction.  Because the political branches are ill-
suited—perhaps incapable—of solving this problem, the courts have a duty 
to act.  These laws must be struck down as unconstitutional to protect the 
integrity and transparency of Arizona’s democratic processes. 
 
 
 125  PUBLIC POLICY POLLING, ARIZONA SURVEY RESULTS 1 (2016), available 
at http://progressnowarizona.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/NewPoll_Dark-Money-
Citizen-Referendum-and-Redistricting.pdf.  
 126  See Nicolas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Americans Favor an 
Overhaul of Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2015.  
 127  Id.  
 128  Id.; Roberts, supra note 84 (noting that SB 1516 was passed on strictly partisan lines, 
with only Republicans voting for its passage).  
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V. JUSTICIABILITY CONCERNS 
A. Standing 
If these laws were challenged in a federal court, there is a low chance 
the court would grant the plaintiff(s) standing.  That is because the federal 
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine, which restricts 
the federal courts only to plaintiffs who have suffered a “distinct and 
palpable injury”129 that is not too “general”130 in nature. 
For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court held that 
environmental protection groups do not have standing to challenge 
environmental policies unless its members have suffered a “concrete and 
particularized” injury.131  This requires the plaintiff to have more than a 
“general interest” in the outcome of the suit, and that she make more than a 
generalized grievance about the government.132  Similarly, in Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, the Court held that the victim of a police chokehold did not have 
standing to challenge the police department’s “chokehold policy” because 
there was no evidence that there was a “real and immediate threat of future 
injury [to] the [victim].”133 
For many, achieving Article III standing is an insurmountable task.134  
The Arizona courts, however, are not bound by the strictures of Article 
III.135  Rather, as the Arizona Supreme Court has noted, Arizona’s 
justiciability doctrine “is a prudential consideration rather than a 
jurisdictional one.”136  For this reason, the Arizona courts waived the 
traditional standing requirements when a case (1) presents an “issue[] of 
great public importance” and (2) the parties to that case are “true 
adversaries.”137  Both of these two prongs will be discussed in turn. 
 
 129  Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978).  
 130  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992). 
 131  Id. at 560.   
 132  Id. at 573–76.   
 133  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983).  
 134  See id. at 113–137 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. 
Ct. 1543 (2016); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Gene Nichol, Jr., 
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985).  
 135  Dobson v. State, 309 P.3d 1289, 1292 (Ariz. 2013) (recognizing that the Arizona 
courts are not bound by the “case or controversy” requirement of Art. III, § 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution).  Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (prohibiting 
taxpayer standing), with Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948) (allowing taxpayer 
standing in Arizona when the taxpayer asserts a sufficiently important interest related to the 
expenditure of her tax dollars).   
 136  Biggs v. Cooper, 341 P.3d 457, 460 (Ariz. 2014).  
 137  Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Ariz. 1998). 
LINDVALL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:01 PM 
82 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1 
1. Issues of “Great Public Importance” 
Arizona’s prudential standing requirements are in place, in part, to 
lighten the courts’ caseload.  These requirements, however, are not 
inexorable commandments that prevent judges from hearing truly 
important cases.  In Rios v. Symington, for example, the court disregarded 
“potential standing issues” because the dispute involved issues central to 
the healthy functioning of Arizona’s state government.138  In Rios, the 
President of the State Senate challenged the constitutionality of the 
Governor’s use of a line item veto.139  Typically, members of the 
Legislature do not have standing if they allege only an “institutional 
injury.”140  However, because Rios involved “a dispute at the highest levels 
of [Arizona’s] state government,” the court ignored traditional standing 
requirements.141 
Similarly, in Goodyear Farms v. Avondale, the court heard a case 
challenging the constitutionality of municipal annexation ordinances 
without addressing whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue.142  Because 
the action raised issues of great public importance that were likely to recur, 
addressing standing was not necessary.143 
The constitutionality of state campaign finance laws is surely an issue 
of great public importance worthy of receiving relaxed justiciability 
standards.  Rios and Goodyear illustrate that constitutional challenges are 
likely to be treated as “more important” for justiciability purposes.  Further, 
issues that touch upon the proper functioning of our state government are 
treated with special deference under Arizona standing doctrine.144  A 
constitutional challenge to Arizona’s dark money statutes would satisfy 
both of these factors and should therefore be thought of as an “issue of 
great public importance” for justiciability purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 138  See Rios v. Symington, 833 P.2d 20, 22 n.2 (Ariz. 1992).  
 139  Id.  
 140  See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821, 830 (1997) (dismissing several Senators’ 
challenge to President Clinton’s line item vetoes because members of the Legislature do not 
have standing to challenge an “institutional injury”); Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311, 
317–18 (Ariz. 2003) (same).  
 141  Rios, 833 P.2d at 22.  
 142  Goodyear Farms v. City of Avondale, 714 P.2d 386 (Ariz. 1986).  
 143  Id. at 387 n.1.  
 144  See Biggs v. Cooper, 341 P.3d 457 (Ariz. 2014); Forty-Seventh Legislature v. 
Napolitano, 143 P.3d 1023 (Ariz. 2006); Rios, 833 P.2d at 22.   
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2. Parties That Are “True Adversaries” 
In addition to reducing caseload, Arizona’s prudential standing 
requirements seek to “sharpen the legal issues” by only allowing cases 
between “true adversaries.”145  By requiring the parties to be truly 
adversarial, the courts increase the likelihood that the issues will be fully 
briefed and zealously argued because the parties will have a stake in the 
outcome of the litigation.146 
For this reason, the courts typically do not allow plaintiffs to make 
“generalized grievances”—i.e., claims that do not affect the plaintiff 
personally, but that are made on behalf of society generally.147  In many 
instances, however, the party who was “injured” may have fewer resources 
or poorer arguments than other potential plaintiffs.148  Accordingly, to 
ensure the sharpest possible issues, the Arizona courts have allowed 
plaintiffs to air generalized grievances if (1) the plaintiff has “a legitimate 
interest” in the controversy and (2) “judicial economy and administration 
would be promoted” by allowing the case to proceed.149 
The proliferation of dark money does not “injure” any one person—
just as a Governor accepting a bribe would not injure any one person.  
Corruption affects the political system, and it would behoove the Arizona 
courts to put a stop to it, even if it means relaxing their justiciability 
requirements.  If the plaintiff has a “legitimate interest” in the healthy 
functioning of Arizona’s campaign finance system, the courts should grant 
that party standing to sue. 
B. The Political Question Doctrine 
As a matter of prudence, the Arizona courts have refused to decide 
cases that amount to a “nonjusticiable political question.”150  Many cases 
involve issues that touch on hot-button political topics—but that does not 
 
 145  Bennett v. Brownlow, 119 P.3d 460, 463 (Ariz. 2005); Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 
1019 (Ariz. 1998).  
 146  See Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, 207 P.3d 654, 659 (Ariz. 2008).  
 147  See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Ariz. Ass’n of Providers for 
Persons with Disabilities v. State, 219 P.3d 216, 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Home Builders 
Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 199 P.3d 629, 632–33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).  
 148  For example, if the issue to be litigated concerned the government’s environmental 
regulations, the Sierra Club would be a great litigant to have on one side of the issue.  But 
the Sierra Club is seldom “injured” by the government’s environmental policies, and 
therefore often lacks standing to sue.  See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 272 (1972).   
 149  Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712 P.2d 914, 
919 (Ariz. 1985).  This two-part test is just a fancy way of saying the Arizona courts will 
ignore the standing requirements if the issue is important enough and there are two good 
lawyers on each side.   
 150  See, e.g., Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 170–71 (Ariz. 2007); 
Fogliano v. Brain, 270 P.3d 839, 846–47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).   
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necessarily mean the cases involve a “political question.”  A nonjusticiable 
political question arises when either (1) there is a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment” of the issue to a coordinate branch of 
government, or (2) there is “a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for resolving the issue.151 
For example, Article 11, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution requires the 
Arizona State Legislature to make university tuition “as nearly free as 
possible.”152  However, in Kromko v. Arizona Board of Regents, the 
Arizona Supreme Court held that interpreting this language would amount 
to a nonjusticiable political question.153  Because the duty to make tuition as 
free as possible was constitutionally committed to the Legislature and there 
was no manageable way to determine whether the tuition was “as free” as it 
could be, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to decide the case.154 
In contrast, the court held in Roosevelt v. Bishop that the courts could 
determine whether the state’s school districts were sufficiently “general and 
uniform,” as required by Article 11, § 1 of the Arizona Constitution.155  
Determining whether school districts received roughly equal funding was a 
“judicially manageable” question—the court could simply compare and 
contrast the funding received by each school district.156 
Similarly, determining whether the Arizona Legislature has “enact[ed] 
a law providing for a general publicity . . . of all campaign 
contributions. . .and expenditures” is not a political question.157  The 
Arizona Constitution expressly directs the Legislature to enact a variety of 
laws.  Article 10, § 10 requires the Legislature to provide laws for the sale 
of state lands.158  Article 18, § 1 requires the Legislature to enact laws 
instituting an eight-hour workday for public employees.159  Article 11 
 
 151  Kromko, 165 P.3d at 170 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 
(1993)).  
 152  Ariz. Const. art XI, § 6.  
 153  Kromko, 165 P.3d at 173.  
 154  Id.  
 155  Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).  
 156  Kromko, 165 P.3d at 173 (noting that there were “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for resolving the issue in Roosevelt).  
 157  Cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2017) (arguing that the political question doctrine should be applied in a 
way that “preserve[s] space for substantive policy debates” without “shielding the 
government from proper scrutiny”). 
 158  Ariz. Const. art. X, § 10 (“The legislature shall provide by proper laws for the sale of 
all state lands or the lease of such lands, and shall further provide . . . laws for the protection 
of the . . . residents and lessees of said lands . . . .”).  
 159  Id. at art. XVIII, § 1 (“Eight hours and no more, shall constitute a lawful day’s work 
in all employment by, or on behalf of, the state or any political subdivision of the State.  The 
legislature shall enact such laws as may be necessary to put this provision into effect, and 
shall prescribe proper penalties for any violations of said laws.”).  
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requires the Legislature to enact laws that adequately fund the public-
school system.160  
These provisions are surely enforceable.161  In fact, under Article 
2, § 32, they are “mandatory.”162  For example, if the Legislature refused to 
enact a law instituting an eight-hour workday (as required by Article 
18, § 1), but instead passed a law requiring all public employees to work 
fifteen-hour days, the people would expect—perhaps demand—the courts 
to strike down this law.  Similarly, if the Legislature refused to enact a law 
requiring public disclosure of campaign contributions (as required by 
Article 7, § 16), but instead passed laws that allowed millions of 
undisclosed dollars to flood our political elections, no one would doubt the 
courts’ authority to remedy this problem.   
The Arizona courts, moreover, not only have the authority to strike 
down these corrupt campaign finance laws, they have a duty to do so.163  In 
Roosevelt, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court required the 
Legislature to “enact appropriate laws to finance education in the public 
schools” and tasked the Superior Court with “determin[ing] whether . . . 
[appropriate] legislative action ha[d] been taken.”164  Concededly, 
Roosevelt put the courts in a precarious position—if the Legislature ignored 
the court order, there would be no practical way to enforce it.165  However, 
given the importance of public education and the constitutional 
 
 160  Id. at art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system . . . .”); id. at 
art. XI, § 9 (“[T]he legislature shall enact such laws as will provide for increasing the county 
fund sufficiently to maintain all the public schools of the county for a minimum term of six 
months in every school year . . . .”); id. at art. XI, § 10 (“[T]he legislature shall make such 
appropriations, to be met by taxation, as shall insure the proper maintenance of all state 
educational institutions, and shall make such special appropriations as shall provide for their 
development and improvement . . . .”).  
 161  In fact, the Arizona courts have consistently and explicitly required the Legislature to 
enact laws that better provide for Arizona’s public school system pursuant to Article 11.  
See Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. 
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).  
 162  Ariz. Const. art. II, § 32 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless 
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”).  
 163  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 663 (1961) (“It is the duty of the courts to be watchful 
of constitutional rights and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”) (citing Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)); Rural/Metro Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 629 
P.2d 86, 89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (“It is the duty of the courts, not the legislature, to 
interpret and construe ambiguous constitutional provisions.”), rev’d on other grounds, 629 
P.2d 83 (Ariz. 1981).  See also Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 815 (striking down Arizona’s 
statutory financing scheme for public education because “the laws chosen by the legislature 
to implement its constitutional obligation” were insufficient).  
 164  Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 816.  
 165  Perhaps the Executive branch could have enforced the order by force.  But what 
would that look like: the state police ordering legislators to pass appropriate school-funding 
bills?  
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implications of the issue, the Roosevelt Court had no choice but to enter the 
fray.  The same is true of these campaign finance statutes.  If the 
Legislature continues to shirk its duty to make Arizona elections 
transparent, public confidence in our state democracy will gradually 
eroded, and our governing bodies would cease to have proper legitimacy. 
As Roosevelt illustrates, the courts will direct the Legislature to fulfill 
its constitutional obligations if the case is sufficiently important and 
judicially manageable.166  Like the plaintiffs in Roosevelt, a plaintiff 
challenging the Legislature’s failure to “enact a law providing for a general 
publicity . . . of . . . campaign contributions” is merely asking the State to 
“enact laws necessary to establish and maintain a system that will 
transform that right from dry words on paper to a reality, bringing to 
fruition the progressive views of those who founded this state.”167 
C. Conclusion to Part IV 
The courts usually do not allow plaintiffs to air “generalized 
grievances.”  However, they will hear certain generalized cases when the 
issues are sufficiently important, and the parties are truly adversarial.  The 
constitutionality of Arizona campaign finance laws is an issue of great 
public importance.  Therefore, if there are two adversarial parties willing to 
fully brief the issues, the Arizona courts should grant the plaintiffs 
standing. 
Additionally, interpreting the General Publicity Clause would not 
amount to a nonjusticiable political question.  As Roosevelt illustrates, the 
courts will not allow the Legislature to completely shirk its constitutional 
obligations.  If the Legislature passes laws that “create substantial 
disparities among [the public] schools,” the courts will strike those laws 
down under Article 11, § 1.168  Similarly, when the Legislature passes laws 
that allow millions of dollars in dark money to flood our state elections, the 
courts should not hesitate to strike down these laws under Article 7, § 16.169 
 
 166  See Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 823 (Feldman, J., concurring) (noting that the Art. XI, § 1 
issue was very important); Kromko, 165 P.3d at 173 (noting that there were “judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards” for resolving the issue in Roosevelt).  See also 
Cohen, supra note 157, at 58 (arguing that, despite the current political question doctrine, 
the courts will still decide hard, politically salient cases when necessary).   
 167  Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 823 (Feldman, J., concurring).   
 168  Id. at 816.  
 169  The political question doctrine, moreover, should not be applied in a way that would 
insulate the Legislature from proper scrutiny or discourage political participation.  Cohen, 
supra note 157, at 5; see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005) (arguing that the 
Constitution should be interpreted in a way that promotes democratic participation).   
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VI. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS CONSIDERED 
A. Counterargument: Requiring 501(c)(4)s to Disclose Their Donors 
Would Violate the Constitutional Principles Set Forth in NAACP 
v. Alabama and McIntyre v. Ohio 
1. Background 
The courts have rightfully been wary of laws requiring political 
disclosure.  Throughout the twentieth century, the States employed dozens 
of strategies in an effort to suppress the black vote.170  In 1927, for 
example, the Court struck down a Texas law preventing black voters from 
participating in primary elections.171  In 1944, the Court was forced to 
strike down a “reenacted” version of this same Texas law.172  In 1953, the 
Court held that Texas could not delegate its control over polling stations to 
private, racially discriminatory organizations.173  Racially discriminatory 
voting regulations such as these “infected the electoral process in parts of 
[the] country for nearly a century.”174  This served as the backdrop for 
NAACP v. Alabama. 
In NAACP v. Alabama, the NAACP was charged with violating an 
Alabama law requiring out-of-state corporations to “qualify” with the 
Secretary of State before doing business in the state.175  During the 
discovery process, the state served the NAACP with a subpoena, requesting 
the names and addresses of all the association’s Alabama members.176  
Compelled disclosure of this sort, the Court held, impermissibly curtailed 
the members’s freedom of association.177  Requiring a revelation of 
membership could likely lead to the sort of reprisals that would chill core 
First Amendment activity, such as “loss of employment, threat[s] of 
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”178  For this 
reason, the state cannot compel the disclosure of an advocacy group’s 
members. 
The Court further extended this holding in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission, where the Court held that private citizens have a First 
Amendment right to disseminate anonymous campaign literature.179  The 
 
 170  See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 560 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 171  Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).   
 172  Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658 (1944).  
 173  Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).  
 174  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).  
 175  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).   
 176  Id. at 453.   
 177  Id. at 462–63.   
 178  Id. at 462.  
 179  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).  
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state cannot indiscriminately outlaw anonymous speech, the Court held.180  
To do so would chill the freedom of speech and would disallow 
pamphleteers to express their ideas without “fear of retaliation.”181 
 
2. NAACP and McIntyre Do Not Prevent States from Requiring 
501(c)(4) Organizations to Disclose Their Donors’s 
Identities. 
Requiring 501(c)(4) organizations to disclose their political donors 
would not run afoul of the First Amendment.182  In 2011, the federal 
DISCLOSE Bill reached the House Floor.183  This Bill, which was 
ultimately defeated, would have required 501(c)(4) organizations to 
disclose their contributors if the organization made independent 
expenditures for express advocacy or electioneering 
communications.184  By limiting disclosure requirements to only those 
organizations that engage in overtly political activity, Congress likely 
ensured this law was sufficiently tailored to withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny.185  In fact, this Bill was tailored to conform with the Supreme 
Court’s language in Citizens United, which endorsed such disclosure 
requirements.186 
Citizens United and its ilk demonstrate the Court’s encouragement of 
these disclosure requirements.187  “It is undoubtedly true,” the Court stated 
in Buckley, that certain disclosure requirements “will deter some 
individuals” from engaging in expressive activity,188 but the courts have 
consistently upheld disclosure requirements that are sufficiently tailored to 
serve the government’s compelling interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption in government.189  Any good disclosure law, 
accordingly, would ensure it does not require more disclosure than 
 
 180  Id. at 357.  
 181  Id. at 343, 357.  
 182  See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt 
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 401–06 (2011) (listing several 
ways in which Congress could constitutionally require tax-exempt organizations to disclose 
their political donors).  
 183  “DISCLOSE” was an acronym standing for Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting 
Light On Spending in Elections.  Despite having a cringe-worthy title, this Bill would have 
been a very positive step toward reigning in dark money in federal elections.   
 184  Aprill, supra note 182, at 403.  
 185  Id. at 401–06.  
 186  See id. at 403.  
 187  Id. at 405.  
 188  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. 
 189  See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459–60 (2014); Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 366–71; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.  
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necessary.  The Court has made clear that disclosure cannot be compelled 
when doing so would cause the group to be subjected to unwanted 
reprisals.190  A properly tailored law, therefore, should also include 
exceptions for minor political parties and disfavored minority groups.191 
In addition to the Court “signing-off” on political disclosure 
requirements, scholars have also called for stricter disclosure requirements 
from both the States and the federal government.192  Disclosure often makes 
political communications more informative and less 
misleading.193  Disclosure prohibits nothing and assumes that people can 
process information and make better choices if they have more 
information.  And the underlying appeal of disclosure is that it will produce 
informed decisions by the public, whether as voters, donors, or 
shareholders.194   
B. Counterargument: Even If the Legislature Required 501(c)(4)s and 
Other Dark Money Organizations to Disclose Their Donors, This 
Still Would Not Enlighten the Electorate—Voters Would Not 
Research Which Candidate was Financed by Which 
Organization, and Even If They Did, the Vast Majority of Donors 
Would be Unknown to the Voter195 
There is no denying that this objection is—at least in some part—true.  
The last thing on a mother’s mind as she picks her kids up from soccer 
practice is who financed her State Senator’s last campaign—she does not 
know, and she probably does not care.  Most people do not have the time, 
wherewithal, or inclination to look up campaign finance disclosures. But 
reporters do. 
This same argument could have been made to suppress the Pentagon 
Papers—those documents were thousands of pages in length, and no 
average person would have been able to comprehend those documents 
without the aid of the reporters at the New York Times and the Washington 
Post.  Almost all-important political issues are too complicated and 
 
 190  Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm’n, 459 U.S. 87, 93 (1982) (citing 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).  
 191  See Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1031–35 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (striking down a Montana law requiring the disclosure of de minimis in-kind 
contributions).   
 192  Aprill, supra note 182, at 401–06; Roger Colinvaux, Political Activity Limits and 
Tax Exemption: A Gordian’s Knot, 34 VA. TAX REV. 1, 47–49 (2014); see generally Sugin, 
supra note 92.  
 193  Sugin, supra note 92, at 919.   
 194  Id. at 919–20.   
 195  See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures on Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 265–67 
(2010).  
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nuanced for the average person to understand without the help of 
journalists.  However, that is no reason to suppress the information.  We 
trust—at least we used to trust196—in our journalistic institutions to shed 
light into these complicated political areas.  We should continue to keep 
this faith. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the early 1990s, Arizona’s public-school system was a disgrace.  
Arizona had one of the lowest per-pupil spending rates, the lowest teacher 
salaries, and some of the largest class sizes in the country.  In 1994, the 
Arizona Supreme Court decided Roosevelt v. Bishop, where the Court 
required the Legislature to fulfill its constitutional obligation to “establish 
minimum adequate facility standards and [to] provide funding to ensure 
that no district falls below them.”197  In response to Roosevelt and its 
progeny, the Legislature (1) substantially increased its funding of the public 
school system; (2) created the School Facilities Board, and charged it with 
developing minimum school facility adequacy guidelines; and (3) provided 
the school districts with “soft” funds for the purchase of textbooks, 
computers, school buses, and other equipment. 
The time has come for the courts to require the State Legislature to 
meet another one of its constitutional obligations: the obligation to 
“provid[e] for a general publicity . . . of all campaign contributions . . . and 
expenditures . . . .”198  To quote Justice Elena Kagan: “Arizonans deserve 
better.  Like citizens across this country, Arizonans deserve a government 
that represents and serves them all.  And no less, Arizonans deserve the 
chance to reform their electoral system so as to attain that most American 
of goals.”199  I agree. 
 
 
 196  See Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP, Sept. 
14, 2016 (finding that less than one-third of Americans have “a fair amount” of trust in the 
media), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-
new-low.aspxhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-
low.aspx.  
 197  Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634, 637 (Ariz. 1998) (Albrecht II).  
 198  Ariz. Const. art VII, § 16.   
 199  Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 785 (2011) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting).  
